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SIGNIFICANCE, OUTCOMES, AND RATIONALE
Fisnik Korenica 1 and Dren Doli 2

ABSTRACT
This article discusses the issue of constitutional rigidity
from the perspective of the Constitution of Kosovo. At the outset, the article analyzes the amendment procedure within the
Constitution and its nature in terms of the actors and procedures involved. Next, the article questions the nature of constitutional rigidity in Kosovo and seeks to address the position
of veto players. Arguing that the Constitution of Kosovo is rather rigid, the article then questions the significance of consti1 Fisnik Korenica is a lecturer on the “Theory of State and Law” at the
University of Prishtina and a Senior Research Fellow at the Group for Legal
and Political Studies. The paper is written as part of the Group for Legal and
Political Studies’ research project “Assessing Democracy in the Western Balkans.” The authors thank the Group for Legal and Political Studies’ Research Committee for providing in-depth comments and recommendations on
the first draft.
2 Dren Doli is a Senior Research Fellow at the Group for Legal and Political Studies and a Senior Lecturer on “Law Principles” at Universum University College. Prior to this, he served as a Senior Legal Executive for Integration to the Kosovo Prime Minister.
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tutional rigidity in light of the model of separation of powers,
human rights, and the Constitutional Court’s constitutional
“updating” role. The article concludes that constitutional rigidity in Kosovo offers a rather authoritative role to the Constitutional Court, allowing it to address the issue of the scope and
substance of the Constitution through its own case law.
KEYWORDS
Kosovo – Constitution – Constitutional Rigidity – Separation of Powers – Human Rights Instruments – Constitutional
Court.
INTRODUCTION
The stability of constitutional regimes and the overall performance of constitutional systems are often regarded as consequences of constitutional rigidity. Though many argue that
constitutional systems that are regarded as rigid face problems
because of the dynamism of societal and political affairs, the
view that constitutional rigidity is nevertheless hugely significant in certain processes is true and widely accepted. Therefore, constitutional rigidity is a rather important factor within
a constitutional system and certain constitutional regimes in
the world regard their rigid nature as important to their feasibility and performance.
Constitutional rigidity is a phenomenon that illustrates
how “tough” it is to amend a constitution. Therefore, rigid constitutions are those that have tough amending procedures, as
opposed to flexible constitutions, which could be amended easily and through “flexible” procedures. A rigid constitution, however, produces many results, most importantly, the “stiffness”
to use the political tools for overcoming constitutional provisions. As such, constitutional rigidity is often regarded as a
counter-balance for political actions that tend to make constitutional provisions comply with the political needs of a country or
partisan interests. However, on the other hand, certain scholars would nevertheless argue that constitutional rigidity diminishes the chances of making constitutional provisions comply with reality and satisfy societal needs. To begin, this article
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approaches the notion of constitutional rigidity by conceptualizing it as a double-faced phenomenon, namely the rigidness of
amending the constitution and the great influence of constitutional courts’ rulings, which remain practically unaffected by a
“revenge” constitutional amendment or legislative battle. 3
This article discusses a number of issues related to rigidity
in the Constitution of Kosovo, making the topic quite appealing
and novel. Most particularly, the article explores four issues:
first, the rigidity of the Constitution of Kosovo, second, the relationship between the Constitution’s rigidity and the model of
separation of powers set by it, third, the importance of constitutional rigidity in face of constitutional human rights, and
fourth, constitutional rigidity in the face of the Constitution’s
dynamic interpretation.
Most would agree that the international state-building
process in Kosovo has ended up with an internationally supervised constitutional drafting process. 4 Though the domestic political elites, from almost every ethnicity, 5 have been
represented and have “written” the Constitution of Kosovo, one
can argue that the latter is a product of the Ahtisaari Settlement and the overall international state-building efforts over
Kosovo. 6 Therefore, the Constitution of Kosovo’s rationale is
3 See AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND
PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES 219, 223 (1999), available at
http://yalepress.yale.edu/yupbooks/excerpts/lijphart_patterns.pdf.
4 See John Tunheim, Rule of Law and the Kosovo Constitution, 18 MINN.
J. INT’L. L. 371, 376-78 (2009).
5 See President’s Proclamation Appointing the Constitution Commission
of
the
Republic
of
Kosovo
(Feb.
19,
2008),
available
at
http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/VENDIMI_I_PRESIDENT
IT_per_KKK_ENG.pdf.
6 For more information on the certification of the Kosovo Constitution,
see generally Press Release, Secretariat of Constitutional Commission, Government of Kosovo, Draft Constitution of Republic of Kosovo is Certified (Apr.
2, 2008), available at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/?cid=2,203,1316&tpl=news.php (demonstrating Peter Faith’s decision on the certification of the
Kosovan Constitution). Press Release, International Civilian Office, Second
Meeting of the International Steering Group (ISG) for Kosovo (Apr. 17, 2008),
¶ 4, available at http://www.ico-kos.org/pdf/17%20April%202008%20Vienna.pdf (discussing the certification of the Constitution). For more information on the Ahtisaarian Settlement process, see generally HENRY H.
PERRITT, THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE FOR KOSOVO: A CHRONICLE OF THE
AHTISAARI PLAN (2009) (explaining how Kosovo became an independent state
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based on an international design for Kosovo, which was aimed
at building a multiethnic state of Kosovo. 7 Given this, most of
the choices forced by internationals within the constitutional
drafting process in Kosovo have been aimed at building protection mechanisms for the ethnic minorities in Kosovo, and sustaining the overall multiethnic character of the polity. 8 In view
of the latter, the character of Kosovo’s Constitution, in terms of
the amending model, follows the same rationale. 9 This article
will begin with a discussion of the Kosovo Constitution’s
amendment process.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGIDITY AND THE KOSOVO
CONSTITUTION
The British constitutional system illustrates the most flexible “constitution” in the world. In fact, the doctrine of “parliamentary sovereignty,” the principle governing the constitutional system of United Kingdom, allows the UK Parliament to
pass an amendment to the constitution by adopting a law with
a simple majority of votes. Moreover, there is no British court
that could question the constitutionality of laws passed by the
UK Parliament, which is logically fashioned by the British constitutional model. As such, the British example is in opposition
to “constitutional rigidity.”
With the British system in mind, the constitutional systems of other countries can be compared in order to understand
and providing a broader view on the Ahtisaarian settlement process). For
more information on the state-building process in Kosovo, see generally INT’L
CRISIS GRP., KOSOVO’S FRAGILE TRANSITION, EUROPE REPORT NO. 196 (Sep. 25,
2008), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/196_kosovos_fragile_transition.ashx (discussing the state-building process in Kosovo).
7 See, e.g. Colin Warbrick, Kosovo: The Declaration of Independence, 57
COMP. L.Q. 675 (2008).
8 See generally Joseph Marko, The New Kosovo Constitution in a Regional Comparative Perspective, 33 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 437 (2008); MARC
WELLER, CONTESTED STATEHOOD: KOSOVO’S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE
(2009).
9 The European Commission argues that the Constitution of Kosovo is a
constitution of a high European standard, see generally Commission Staff
Working Document, Kosovo (under UNSCR 1244/99) 2008 Progress Report,
SEC (2008) 2697 working doc. (May 11, 2008).
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their constitutional amendment processes. One can argue that
the constitutional amendment process depends on the model of
the state governed by the constitution in question. This means
that federal states have largely different approaches for
amending a constitution when compared to unitary states. In
fact, one could argue that federal constitutions are per se more
difficult to amend than unitary states’ constitutions.
In principle, there are three models of constitutional
amendment: 1) constitutional amendment solely through a
simple majority in parliament, 2) constitutional amendment
through interaction between parliament and the people
through a referendum, and 3) constitutional amendment by
combining double majorities and/or supermajorities in the parliament, delays, thresholds, etc.
The first model of constitutional review belongs to the
“flexible” models of constitutional amending and this article
will thus not discuss this category further. Surely, the British
example fits within this model. The second model reflects a
model of constitutional rigidity since the constitutional
amendment could be undertaken only if a majority in parliament has provided the endorsement, and the people through a
referendum have agreed. 10 In this case, the rigid nature of the
constitutional amendment would have both political legitimacy
deriving from parliament, and popular legitimacy deriving
from the people’s say in the referendum. There are a number
of models under the third method, however, which combine
mainly institutional and threshold elements in the constitutional amendment process. Such examples could include the
double majority in a two-chamber parliament, the qualified
majority of two-thirds or four-fifths in a single-chamber parliament, the qualified majority (of any kind) in parliament (one
or more chambers) plus the endorsement of the people or the
president, etc. 11
10 For examples from the American states’ constitutions and how the
popular say hampers the constitutional amendment process or the proposed
amendment itself, see generally Charles V. Laughlin, A Study in Constitutional Rigidity I, 10 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1943).
11 For further information on the various models of constitutional
amendment and the steps that can make a constitution rigid, see JON ELSTER,
ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND
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Prior to embarking on an analysis of the Kosovo perspective, this article will provide some examples of constitutional
amendment models. 12 The US Constitution, a federal state
constitution, provides several methods of amendment. With regard to the amendment process, the United States Constitution
states:
the Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on
the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several
States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes,
as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of
three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may
be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment
which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth
Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage
in the Senate. 13

Based on Article V of the US Constitution, one can say that
this instrument could be changed in many ways. Most importantly, the initiative for commencing the amendment procedure
belongs to both to Congress and the States’ legislatures. Congress nor the States have a monopoly over the initiation of the
amendment process. Approval of amendments rests with the
individual States. On the other hand, a close examination of
the above-mentioned article, shows that it prohibits the
amendment of some articles and sections of the Constitution.
For instance, Article V prohibits a constitutional amendment
touching issues such as the prohibition of equal suffrage by the
States in the Senate. Therefore, this leads to the idea that
through Article V, the US Constitution establishes a hierarchy
CONSTRAINTS 101 (2000); LIJPHART, supra note 3, at 219; JAN-ERIK LANE,
CONSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY 114 (1996).
12 Many provide evidence that almost all constitutions in the world possess articles that allow partial or total change of the constitution, see generally HENC VAN MAARSEVEEN & GER VAN DER TANG, WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONS: A
COMPUTERIZED COMPARATIVE STUDY (1978).
13 U.S. CONST. art. V.
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between the constitutional norms themselves and prohibits
constitutional amendments that would affect issues concerning
equal suffrage of the States in the Senate. Article V demonstrates that the people are neither directly allowed to participate, for example through a referendum, in the initiation of the
constitutional amendment nor adoption processes. Still, the
amendment process is quite difficult and complex. As such, the
three issues posed by Article V of the US Constitution will be
analyzed within the context of the Constitution of Kosovo
amending procedure also.
If France is taken as an example, two approaches could be
followed in order to amend that country’s constitution. The
first method is to obtain a majority of votes in both chambers of
the French Parliament and a majority of the people’s votes in a
referendum. The second method is to attain a two-thirds of
vote in a joint plenary session of both chambers of Parliament
with no need for a referendum required. 14 France’s Constitution also sets forth that the decision of whether to place a constitutional amendment in a referendum rests with the President even though it might have been endorsed through the
second method discussed above. Regarding the hierarchy of
norms within the Constitution, the French Constitution states
that the “republican form” of government cannot be amended
in any way. 15 Therefore, it is implied that an amendment of
the French Constitution is not directly up to the people and
that it might be amended within the parliamentary framework
only. Additionally, it is clear that the prohibition to changing
the republican form of government reflects the superiority the
constitutional norm regulating that issue has in the French
Constitution.
In Switzerland, one would be able to speak for special majorities. Amendments to the Swiss Constitution require the
approval of not only a majority of the Swiss people by referendum, but also of the majority of the cantons. More specifically,
“[t]he half-cantons are given half weight in the canton-bycanton calculation; this means that, for instance, a constituSee LIJPHART, supra note 3, at 222.
Carl J. Friedrich, The New French Constitution in Political and Historical Perspective, 72 HARV. L. REV. 801, 835 (1959).
14
15
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tional amendment can be adopted by 13.5 cantons in favor and
12.5 against.” 16
Having discussed some of the prevailing approaches to
amending a constitution, let us embark on analyzing the
process as laid down in the Constitution of Kosovo.
In the main body of the Kosovo Constitution the following
about sovereignty and its sources, is proclaimed “the sovereignty of the Republic of Kosovo stems from the people, belongs to
the people and is exercised in compliance with the Constitution
through elected representatives, referendum and other forms
in compliance with the provisions of this Constitution.” 17
As far as Article 2.1 of the Constitution of Kosovo is concerned, one can say that since the source of sovereignty rests
with the people, then they are the only ones that can amend
the Constitution. However, Article 2.1 makes it clear that,
even though the Constitution recognizes the people as the
source of sovereignty, it paves the way for allowing indirect
methods of constitutional amendment by the people. In fact,
since the Constitution of Kosovo proclaims that sovereignty can
be exercised both through referendum and elected representatives, one could argue that the constitutional amendment
process is brought “outside” the direct control of the people.
Logically, the counter-popular elements in the amendment procedure of the Constitution of Kosovo are consequently complimentary with Article 2.1. On the other hand, Article 2.1 does
not restrict or prohibit the people’s direct participation in the
exercise of sovereignty, for example, through the constitutional
amendment process, but it does nevertheless pave the way for
another method, that of exercising sovereignty through representatives.
The first question relating to the amendment process is,
who and how many actors can initiate the procedure concerned.
Article 144.1 of the Kosovo Constitution authorizes three actors
to initiate the constitutional amendment process, namely, the
Government, the President of Republic, and one fourth of
LIJPHART, supra note 3 at 40.
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO June 15, 2008, art. 2, §1,
available at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf.
16
17

CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGIDITY
IN
KOSOVO:
SIGNIFICANCE, OUTCOMES, AND RATIONALE
Members of Parliament (MPs). With Article 144.1 in mind, one
can make at least two arguments. First, institutional actors
have a monopoly over the initiation of an amendment to the
Kosovo Constitution. Since there is no room for popular initiatives for amending the Constitution, one could argue that the
initiative on the constitutional amendment process in Kosovo is
closed off to direct participation by the people and biased
against them. Moreover, since only three institutional actors
are authorized to raise the issue or initiate the constitutional
amendment process, we argue that the control over the initiation of the constitutional amendment process is rather monopolistic in institutional terms also. Second, the initiative on constitutional amendment is rather biased and no pluralistic
ground can be found in it. As will be argued below, the model
of separation of powers established by the Kosovo Constitution
allows the government and the President of Republic to belong
to one governmental coalition as practice so illustrates. 18
Though one-fourth of MPs is a small number of votes to allow a
parliamentarian vibrant ground to initiating constitutional
amendments for even small political parties in the Parliament,
one can argue that the MPs are usually party members and follow partisan interests. Hence, the right to initiate the amendment of the Kosovo Constitution rests with partisan members
and interests overall and no independent and/or non-partisan
institution, for example, the ombudsperson, can be part of the
initiative concerned. We argue that the initiative to amend the
Constitution is a monopoly of institutional actors on the one
hand, and partisan members on the other, though one can
speak for a partisan-plural ground when it comes to the small
number of MPs allowed to initiate the amendment process.
With this in mind, one can argue that the right on initiating a
constitutional amendment requires a rigid procedure, when
considering that popular initiatives and independent institutions are not authorized to initiate it. The opposite is true
when the issue is seen from a political perspective since the initiative can come so flexibly from political institutions. Hence,
when taken as a whole, the counter-popular character of the
18 See Fisnik Korenica & Dren Doli, Calling the Kosovo’s Constitution: A
Legal Review, 22 DENNING L.J. 51, 63 (2010) (Eng.).
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right in initiating a constitutional amendment follows the constitutional rationale for “restraining” popular initiatives and
the rule of majority, that is common to consociational constitutional regimes. This will be further supported with the arguments and analysis depicting the adoption of constitutional
amendment proposals shown below.
To dig deeper into the question of the amendment process
and in order to argue whether the Kosovo Constitution is flexible or rigid, we quote Article 144.2, the constitutional article
describing the amendment process:
[a]ny amendment shall require for its adoption the approval of
two thirds (2/3) of all deputies of the Assembly including two
thirds (2/3) of all deputies of the Assembly holding reserved or
guaranteed seats for representatives of communities that are not
in the majority in the Republic of Kosovo. 19

Article 144.2 is the only part in the Kosovo Constitution
that explicitly regulates the issue of the adoption of constitutional amendments. Article 144.2 establishes a number of
principles regarding the model the amendment process of the
Kosovo Constitution follows in terms of the debate between rigidity and flexibility. In view of Article 144.2, one can come up
with at least four arguments. 20
First, Article 144.2 introduces an amendment process that
is more than a requirement for a simple majority. In contrast
to the flexible British Constitution, the Kosovo Constitution
can be amended through a parliamentary route only. Twothirds of MPs, in fact, is quite a high bar to clear in Parliament,
and it would represent a rather wide compromise. Hence,
through a simple calculation, two-thirds of the overall membership of Parliament is equal to 80 MPs or 66.6 percent.
Second, in view of Article 144.2, the adoption of a constitu19 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO June 15, 2008, art. 144, §2,
available at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf.
20 Many constitutions in Europe follow the same constitutional amendment process, namely amendment of the constitution through parliament,
see, e.g., 1994 CONST. art. 195 (Belg.); C.E, B.O.E. n. 167/8, Dec. 29, 1978
(Spain); BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [BV-G][CONSTITUTION] BGBl No.
1/1930, as last amended by Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] BGBl I No.
2/2008 art. 44 (Austria).
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tional amendment to the Kosovo Constitution requires a double
supermajority. Hence, the double majority, which consists of
both a two-third majority of Parliament and a two-third majority of the ethnic minority MPs in Parliament, is a rather high
bar for the adoption of a constitutional amendment.
By digging deeper into the issue of double majorities, one
can bring an interesting argument. 21 First, concerning the entire parliamentary two-third majority (the first supermajority
required), a two-third majority is somewhat beyond the number
of MPs required to build a coalition government. 22 In this context, an absolute majority in Parliament (50 percent + one)
could appoint both the Government and the President of Republic in the final process. Hence, logically and politically, a
governmental coalition would never be close or equal to twothirds of MPs. With this in mind, the first majority required to
adopt a constitutional amendment, seeks to set forth a parliamentary bar or threshold that exceeds the coalition of parties
that usually hold the Government. Therefore, as far as a majority of two-thirds of the votes in Parliament is required for
the adoption of a constitutional amendment, a coalition government would not be able to satisfy this condition alone, at
least logically and practically, even though the idea of having a
coalition government consisting of two-thirds of MPs is not impossible. To this extent, the supermajority of two-thirds of Parliament, required to pass a constitutional amendment could not
be a monopoly of the ruling coalition government. Instead, a
broader consensus, with parties that stand outside the coalition
government is needed. Second, concerning the two-thirds of
minority MPs required to pass a constitutional amendment
21 To increase the rigidity of this amendment procedure, the constitution
drafters could have used the “delay” device in the amendment procedure.
However, with the current regulation, the amendment procedure cannot be
delayed, which suggests that the amendment can be adopted within minutes,
if the votes taken satisfy the requirement set forth in the provision concerned. For more information on the “delay” device in the amendment
process, see ELSTER, supra note 11, at 143. Some constitutions require that in
order for an amendment to be adopted, it must take the supermajority in two
legislatures, namely, take the vote in the parliament existing under the current mandate, and the parliament that will be made with the coming election.
22 See Korenica & Doli, supra note 18, at 84-85.
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(the second supermajority required), it represents a supermajority that is both broad and rather inclusive in terms of ethnic
minorities represented in the Kosovo Parliament. 23 A twothirds majority of ethnic minority MPs, in fact, exceeds the
number of seats that Serbs alone have in the current composition of Parliament. It means that, a two-thirds majority at the
level of ethnic minority MPs is not a monopoly of Serbian MPs
alone, with Serbs being the largest ethnic minority in Kosovo.
This, therefore, suggests that the two-thirds minority MPs’
vote in Parliament is neither a prerogative of one ethnic community’s MPs, say Serbian MPs, nor an easily reachable bar
from the perspective of other ethnic communities’ MPs. 24 However, can the Kosovo Parliament remain without any ethnic
minority MP and dismiss the supermajority required? No, the
Kosovo Constitution offers twenty reserved seats for ethnic minority MPs, regardless of the popular vote results. 25 The model
of constitutional amendment provided by the provision concerned follows a power-sharing rationale, as does the entire
Kosovo Constitution. 26
Third, Article 144.2 allows no room for popular say in the
adoption of an amendment proposal. The adoption of a constitutional amendment cannot be put to a referendum or in any

23 There are twenty reserved seats for ethnic minority representatives.
The international community has these seats be reserved, one could say, see
JAMES HUGHES, CONFERENCE PAPER, COMPARING THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT
MODEL IN THE ‘SUI GENERIS’ CASES OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND KOSOVO at 13
(Sep. 10-12, 2009), available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/26061/. There are
three ethnic minority parliamentary groups in Kosovo’s Assembly currently
with more than 20 MPs, see Republic of Kosovo Assembly, Numerical Representation of the Kosovo Assembly, http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,107 (last visited Jan. 23, 2011).
24 See generally Oisin Tansey, Kosovo Independence and Tutelage, 20 J.
DEMOCRACY 153 (2009); GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS WORK (2002).
25 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO June 15, 2008, art. 64,
available at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf.
26 See generally Korenica & Doli, supra note 18; see also AREND LIJPHART,
THE POLITICS OF ACCOMMODATION: PLURALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE
NETHERLANDS (1968); AREND LIJPHART, THINKING ABOUT DEMOCRACY: POWERSHARING AND MAJORITY RULE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008).
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other type of direct popular decision making. 27 Hence, closing
off the amendment adoption process to popular participation
gives Parliament a monopoly over the constitutional amendment process and makes it a prerogative of political parties’
representatives in Parliament. At the same time, however, besides promoting a monopoly belonging to Parliament, Article
144.2 weakens the likelihood of upholding the principle of rule
of majority. Since this model of amendment with a double supermajority reflects a possibility for veto from the ethnic minority’s MPs in Parliament, adding that people are prohibited
to give a say in the adoption process, this results in the adoption of a constitutional amendment being in opposition to the
principle of rule of majority. With this in mind, the constitutional rigidity provided by Article 144.2 is a countermajoritarian mechanism, 28 which nevertheless provides an
ethnically plural authority when it comes to the constitutional
amendment process. In addition, since this model of constitutional rigidity produced by the Kosovo Constitution is a counter-majoritarian mechanism, one could say that it lacks domestic legitimacy. 29 Nevertheless, popular participation would be
allowed in a legislative procedure, which offers the people
somewhat of a role in the legislative process. However, the Kosovo Constitution dismisses the possibility for referendums in
cases of vital laws, 30 which, therefore, shows that the Constitution and the Constitutional Court’s rulings interpreting the
Constitution cannot be depopularized or deimmunized in the
legislative process either. The idea of prohibiting direct popular participation in constitutional amendment processes stands
in harmony with the principles of consociation or power shar27 This is a normal condition for states that establish constitutions that
provide power-sharing governance (especially in ethnically divided societies),
see generally Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, 15
J. DEMOCRACY 96 (2004).
28 This argument stands in conformity with the general claim made by
LIJPHART, supra note 3, at 230.
29 The problem of domestic legitimacy is a long argued phenomenon that
has followed the Constitution of Kosovo since its adoption, see Marko, supra
note 8, at 449; WELLER, supra note 8, at 258.
30 See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO June 15, 2008, art. 81,
available at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf.
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ing, 31 with Kosovo being an internationally promoted state that
must follow power sharing mechanisms. 32
Fourth, one can question whether there is any part of the
Constitution that cannot be subject to the amendment process.
Doctrinally, many argue that, in general, constitutions should
be amendable, however, some parts should be harder to amend
than others. 33 The Kosovo Constitution through Article 144.3,
sets forth that the adoption of a proposed constitutional
amendment can be considered undertaken “only after the President of the Assembly of Kosovo has referred the proposed
amendment to the Constitutional Court for a prior assessment
that the proposed amendment does not diminish any of the
rights and freedoms set forth in Chapter II of this Constitution.” 34 Though Article 144.3 is not explicitly made to form part
of the amendment process, it, both logically and legally, touches on and influences the amendment process as well. Therefore,
in light of Article 144.3, one would argue that Chapter II of the
Kosovo Constitution could not be subject to a constitutional
amendment that lessens rights, therefore leading to the argument that Chapter II of the Constitution is not amendable. 35 In
For more on power-sharing systems of governance, see generally AREND
LIJPHART, THE POLITICS OF ACCOMMODATION: PLURALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN
THE NETHERLANDS (1968); Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy: The
Views of Arend Lijphart and Collected Criticisms, POL. SCI. REVIEWER [143]
available at http://www.mmisi.org/pr/15_01/schendelen.pdf; AREND LIJPHART,
DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (1977); Arend
Lijphart, Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links, 12
AREND LIJPHART, CONFLICT AND
CANADIAN J. POL. SCI. 499 (1981);
COEXISTENCE IN BELGIUM: THE DYNAMICS OF A CULTURALLY DIVIDED SOCIETY
(1981); AREND LIJPHART, THINKING ABOUT DEMOCRACY: POWER-SHARING AND
MAJORITY RULE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008).
32 See HENRY H. PERRITT, THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE FOR KOSOVO: A
CHRONICLE OF THE AHTISAARI PLAN 1 (2010); WELLER, supra note 8, at 39;
Tunheim, supra note 4, at 376-77.
33 See Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of Constitutional Entrenchment, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 251, 255
(1996).
34 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO June 15, 2008, art. 144, §3,
available at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf.
35 The German Basic Law, for instance, does not allow the amendment
principles within articles 1 and 20, see GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23,
31
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view of Article 144.3, therefore, there is a hierarchy of norms
within the Constitution itself, with Chapter II being unamendable, 36 if the amendment concerned lessens rights. Since the
Constitution gives Chapter II a special role and having argued
that this is the only unamendable part of the Constitution, it
has a higher hierarchy in the system of norms within the Constitution. This, therefore, builds upon the idea that Chapter II
of the Constitution remains untouchable by any amendment,
whereas the constitutional rigidity has no meaning in terms of
the Chapter concerned. 37
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGIDITY AND SEPARATION OF
POWERS FROM THE KOSOVO CONSTITUTION’S
PERSPECTIVE
Having argued that the Constitution of Kosovo is rather
rigid, and having analysed the morphology of the rigidity concerned, we now embark on the impact and/or outcomes that the
constitutional rigidity in Kosovo will deliver. Therefore, in this
section we question the significance and outcomes of constitutional rigidity in face of the model of separation of powers established by the Kosovo Constitution. Prior to embarking on
the debate of constitutional rigidity versus separation of powers in Kosovo’s case, it is worth noting that Ferreres-Comella
has built a rather interesting and grounded argument on the
1949, BGBl. LXXIX (Ger.).
36 The same can be seen in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution,
“[n]o amendment to this Constitution may eliminate or diminish any of the
rights and freedoms referred to in Article II of this Constitution or alter the
present paragraph.” BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA CONSTITUTION Dec. 1, 1995,
art. 10 ¶ 2, available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/bk00000_.html.
37 The Constitution of Kosovo recognizes the prevalence of Ahtisaari Settlement over itself. However, many would say that only the Constitution of
Kosovo could be seen as a groundnorm of Kosovo’s legal order. The Ahtisaari
Settlement, on the other hand, though established by the Constitution as
having supremacy over the Constitution, could be nevertheless dismissed
through a constitutional amendment. If the latter would be the case, then the
provision of the Constitution regulating the status of Ahtisaari Settlement
and its prevalence could not be seen as unamendable. Dren Doli & Fisnik Korenica, What About the Kosovo Constitution: Is There Anything Special? Discussing the Groundnorm, the Sovereignty and the Consociational Model of
Employed Democracy, 4 VIENNA INT’L CONST. L.J. (forthcoming 2010).
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debate concerned. Ferreres-Comella argues that, in parliamentary systems of governance, like most of the European countries, a rigid constitution would deliver a supplementary role
for the constitutional court: that of counterbalancing the two
other branches of government. In fact, argues FerreresComella, since in a parliamentary system of governance the
party or coalition holding the majority of seats in the parliament has no real control over the government, there is no real
control that could come from the parliament over the government. Therefore, the control from the legislative branch vis-àvis the government would not nevertheless “harm” its performance or counterbalance its work, or it does not exist at all.
The only way to somehow oppose the government in parliamentary governance is through the opposition parties in parliament. Hence, in parliamentary systems of governance, argues
Ferreres-Comella, the constitutional courts, and generally the
judiciary, must take the role of balancing the executivelegislative realm. In this context, a rigid constitution, would
strengthen the role of the constitutional court in interpreting
the constitution in a way that counterbalances the politicized
work of the executive-legislative realm, while allowing the latter to have no likelihood of changing the constitution as a way
for surpassing the constitutional court’s rulings. 38 With this in
mind, one wonders if the constitutional rigidity in Kosovo could
play the same role in face of the executive-legislative realm. To
develop an analysis over this, we must first analyze the model
of separation of powers established by the Kosovo Constitution.
The Kosovo Constitution has established a rather pure
parliamentary system of governance, 39 with the establishment
of the separation of powers principle. The country is headed by
a President, who is appointed by Parliament once an absolute
majority of votes in Parliament is reached in the third round.
The executive branch is held by a government, which is appointed by Parliament once an absolute majority of votes (50%
38 See generally Víctor Ferreres-Comella, A Defense of Constitutional Rigidity, Analisi e Diritto 2000, 45, available at http://www.giuri.unige.it/intro/dipist/digita/filo/testi/analisi_2000/ferreres.pdf (describing rigidity of the
Federal Constitution).
39 See Marko, supra note 8, at 444.

CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGIDITY
IN
KOSOVO:
SIGNIFICANCE, OUTCOMES, AND RATIONALE
+ one vote) is obtained. The legislative branch is held by the
unicameral Parliament, which consists of 120 MPs. The judiciary is held by the regular courts, and the constitutional court.
As far as the relationship between the legislative and executive
branches, the Kosovo Constitution provides for a relationship
that is based on the coalition of parties holding the government. In this context, the President of the Republic and the
Government are a product of an agreement between the coalition partners or the party holding the majority of seats in Parliament. 40 In view of this, the control of Parliament towards
the government and the President of the Republic is nevertheless practically impossible since any decision in the Parliament
would need to be made with votes from the MPs coming from
the party or coalition of parties holding the Government and
the President. Hence, legislative control, other than that by
the opposition in Parliament is impossible in the practical context, though Parliament is constitutionally authorized to control the Government. 41 To this extent, the model of separation
of powers provided by the Kosovo Constitution practically and
politically allows a “marriage” between the Government, the
President of the Republic, and the absolute majority of MPs, 42
who are bestowed with the right to take almost any decision
exercising defined legislative powers. In this regard, therefore,
one questions whether the rigid nature of the Kosovo Constitution has any role in the relationship between the executivelegislative realm and the Constitutional Court.
Generally, constitutional rigidity in Kosovo provides for a
strong Constitutional Court, whose rulings cannot be easily
counterbalanced or altered by a constitutional amendment. In
this context, since a constitutional amendment would be very
difficult to pass given the double supermajorities required, the
rulings of Kosovo’s Constitutional Court remain the only route
for interpreting the Constitution. In view of this, constitutional
rigidity in Kosovo puts the Constitutional Court in a very poDoli & Korenica, supra note 18, at 74-80.
See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO June 15, 2008, art. 65,
available at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf.
42 See Doli & Korenica, supra note 18, at 63.
40
41
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werful position and, most importantly, makes it fundamentally
difficult to overrule a decision of the Court through a constitutional amendment or through a legislative or popular vote.
With this in mind, the Kosovo’s Constitutional Court practically enjoys the power to decide what the constitution means and
allows no room for political revenge. This would mean that the
Constitutional Court would have the power to make “factual”
amendments to the Constitution, as opposed to formal ones. In
this regard, the Constitutional Court’s rulings constitute factual amendments to the Constitution, and as such, would be
more open to non-parliamentary interests, since the judicial activity of the Court will be based, among others, on the claims of
the parties standing before it.
Following this argument, therefore, one should ask if constitutional rigidity has as a result a role in the model of separation of powers established by the Constitution. In this regard,
as argued above, since the Kosovo Constitution provides for a
rather pure parliamentary model of governance, the “marriage”
between the executive and legislative branches is somehow impossible to be controlled by the parliamentary opposition.
Hence, constitutional rigidity offers Kosovo’s Constitutional
Court the power to counterbalance and control the constitutionality of actions by the Government, Parliament and President,
which are nevertheless instruments of the party or coalition of
parties holding the majority of seats in Parliament. In such
circumstances, we argue that Kosovo’s Constitutional Court enjoys the power to control the Government, Parliament, or President of the Republic, while no other political or non-political
actors would have the power to do so vigorously. 43 Therefore,
we argue that constitutional rigidity in Kosovo has given the
Constitutional Court the opportunity and power to control the
executive and legislative branches, which have a natural im43 For a broader view on the constitutional provisions regulating the position of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo, see Fisnik Korenica, Pointing the
Rule-of-Law in a Transnational Polity: The Case of Kosovo’s Law on the Constitutional Court, [Vol 10] issue 3 CONTEMP. ISSUES IN L. 183, 187 (2010);
Dren Doli & Fisnik Korenica, Kosovar Constitutional Court’s Jurisdiction:
Searching for Strengths and Weaknesses, 11 German L.J. 803, 809 (2010),
available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol11-No8/PDF_Vol_11_No_08_803-836_Kosovo%20Context_Doli%20&%20Korencia%20FINAL.pdf.
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minence. With this role, therefore, the Constitutional Court
becomes the most powerful controlling and counterbalancing
mechanism in the face of the partisan and political actors holding the executive and legislative branches. Nevertheless the
Constitutional Court’s power, is only possible thanks to the inability of the legislature to amend the Constitution or “fight”
the Constitutional Court’s rulings, which are naturally a product of constitutional rigidity. 44
The authority of the Constitutional Court is further empowered through the constitutional provision, which gives it the
right to control the constitutionality of procedures followed for
adopting a constitutional amendment. This certainly authorizes the Court to ban an amendment if, in the view of Court, it
was issued in a manner that is unconstitutional. 45 Besides
this, one can say that comparative evidence shows that the
broader the power of constitutional review the more freedom in
the polity, 46 which strengthens the arguments made above.
To support the above-mentioned arguments and claims, we
explain two essential Constitutional Court rulings, which test
the accuracy of our claims. First, in Rrustemi et al v. President
of Republic, the Kosovo Constitutional Court, in a decision that
conforms to the nature of a rigid constitution, ruled that the
President of the Republic is violating the Constitution by simultaneously holding the post of President of the Republic and
President of a political party. 47 The President of the Republic,
Mr. Fatmir Sejdiu, claimed that an earlier agreement with politicians allows the holding of the two posts simultaneously and
thus is not a constitutional violation. 48 However, with the rulSee John Ferejohn, The Politics of Imperfection: The Amendment of
Constitutions, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 501, 510 (1997).
45 See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO June 15, 2008, art. 113,
§ 3, cl. 4, available at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf.
46 See Rafael La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. OF
POL. ECON. 445, 448 (2004), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=florencio_lopez_de_silanes.
47 For some more insight on the problem, see generally Doli & Korenica,
supra note 18.
48 See, for instance: Financial Times, 28 September 2010 Retrieved from:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/e383958c-ca48-11df-a860-00144feab49a. See also:
‘Thik pas shpine’. Koha Ditore Newspaper, 28 September 2010, citing Finan44
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ing, the Constitutional Court brought a new legal state of affairs into the political scene, illustrating that partisan agreements and parliamentary inability to seek the implementation
of the Constitution are absolutely dismissed, therefore, leading
into a rigidly controlled parliament and party scene from the
Constitutional Court. 49 With the new ruling, therefore, party
politics has changed directions, and overall there is no possibility for a constitutional amendment to counter the ruling.
Hence, with the ruling in Rrustemi et al. v. President of Republic, the Constitutional Court has shown that it can review and
control the work and the overall performance of the executive
and legislative branches, including partisan agreements, thus
allowing no place for the violation of the Constitution. This, in
turn, has limited the exploitation of the main institutions of the
country by political parties and has changed the way in which
coalition agreements will be viewed in the future. All this, is
based on the attitudes of constitutional rigidity, where revenge
through a constitutional amendment over the Constitutional
Court’s rulings would be impossible.
Second, in Case No. KO 80/10, the Constitutional Court
was asked to decide whether, according to the Constitution, the
resignation of a directly elected mayor from a public post effected with the release of a statement to the media would be
sufficient. In fact, the Ministry for Local Governance has found
itself in a dilemma concerning whether to recognize the resignation of a local mayor from the incumbent-government party.
The mayor claimed that with his return to office, he had annulled the resignation. 50 The Constitutional Court, as a result,
used a highly abstract notion in the Constitution to rule that
the resignation of a public official, elected directly by the
people, does not require confirmation from any institution, and
such an action ends the mayor’s mandate. 51 With this ruling,
cial Times.
49 GYJKATA KUSHTETUESE [CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOSOVO] Sept. 28,
2010, LËNDA NR. KI 47/10, available at http://www.gjk-ks.org/repository/docs/ki_47_10_shq_2.pdf (Kos.).
50 See Presidenti kerkon sqarime ne rastin Qeskaj, (Aug. 18, 2010, 4:26
PM CET), http://www.zeri.info/artikulli/1/1/9840/presidenti-kerkon-sqarimene-rastin-qeskaj/.
51 See GYJKATA KUSHTETUESE [CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOSOVO] RASTI
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therefore, the Constitutional Court confirmed that it effectively
controls the Government and Parliament, respectively since
the executive branch and Parliament, who were on the mayor’s
side, were unable to opine on this issue. Therefore, both cases
show how a rigid constitution has strengthened the Constitutional Court’s role in controlling and reviewing the constitutionality of the executive and legislative branches’ performance
and acts, while ensuring that an act by Parliament to overcome
a ruling would be almost impossible.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGIDITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
GUARANTEES FROM THE KOSOVO CONSTITUTION’S
PERSPECTIVE
In this section, the article embarks on examining the significance of the relationship between constitutional rigidity and
human rights in Kosovo. We approach the issue from a legal
constitutional point of view while pointing out the central issues that are relevant in this regard. Therefore, most practically, we question if the rigid nature of the Kosovo Constitution
affects constitutional human rights. To reach an answer, we
approach the problem from two different perspectives and analyze the issue from the perspectives concerned.
First, the human rights protections afforded by the Kosovo
Constitution are rather numerous. 52 It contains a number of
rights ranging from political, social, economic, and dignity. Besides the list of human rights listed in the Constitution, the
Constitution has constitutionalized a number of international
human rights instruments. 53 Through the constitutionalization of the international instruments concerned, the Constitution has recognized to them a constitutional legal power.
Second, the Constitution, especially in Chapter III, offers a
NR. KO 80/10, available at http://www.gjk-ks.org/repository/docs/aktgjykim_rasti_%20ko_%2080_10.pdf (Kos.).
52 For more information about the international human rights standards
in the Constitution of Kosovo and their relevance in the state building
process, see generally Tunheim, supra note 4.
53 See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO June 15, 2008, art. 22,
available at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf.
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number of special rights for ethnic communities in Kosovo,
both at a personal and collective level. 54 The Constitution has
established a rather privileged position for ethnic communities
that have a minority status in Kosovo. 55 Hence, with these two
issues, one would question if constitutional rigidity in Kosovo
has any effect on constitutional human rights in general or on
ethnic minority constitutional rights’ guarantees.
First, one questions whether constitutional rigidity has
any effect on the issue of constitutional human rights in Kosovo. The rulings of the Constitutional Court in the context of
the interpretation of constitutional human rights will be
deemed as final and to counterbalance those interpretations
through legislative and/or executive action would be almost
impossible. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court would
determine the scope and substance of the rights concerned and
legislative actions challenging those rulings would be almost
unachievable. Since there is a list of ten international human
rights instruments incorporated into the Constitution, the Constitutional Court is able to make rulings that both respect and
employ the substance of the international instruments concerned. This, therefore, leads to a type of constitutional justice
that addresses the issue of human rights through the Court’s
own case law on international human rights instruments,
while allowing no room for the legislative branch to limit or
ban the rights that have been guaranteed by the instruments
concerned and the constitutional courts’ rulings. Overall, therefore, in the field of human rights, constitutional rigidity allows
the Constitutional Court to produce powerful rulings, which
cannot be overturned by the legislature and the Court’s reference to international human rights instruments will increase
and internationalize the scope of human rights available in Kosovo. Constitutional rigidity, as such, will, first, allow the Constitutional Court to determine through its own case law the
substance and scope of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Constitution while, second, also hindering the idea of the legisFor a broader view of this, see generally Marko, supra note 8.
For more information on ethnic minorities’ privileges in Kosovo, see
generally id.; WELLER, supra note 8; MINORITY RIGHTS IN CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE (Bernd Rechel, ed., 2009).
54
55
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lature dealing with the definition of rights and constitutional
principles of human rights. Additionally, thanks to the Constitution’s rigid nature, the Constitutional Court’s “expanded”
role with regard to human rights leads to more political freedom. 56
Second, one would question if constitutional rigidity has a
role with regard to ethnic minority constitutional rights in Kosovo. Besides being quite appealing, the rigid mechanism built
within the Kosovo Constitution was primarily aimed at assuring that ethnic minority rights and privileges remain unaffected from majority rule. 57 Hence, constitutional rigidity in
Kosovo would assure that no right or privilege at the personal
or collective level guaranteed by the Constitution to ethnic minorities in Kosovo would be hindered or interfered with unless
the ethnic minority MPs themselves provide their assent. This
means that Parliament would only amend a constitutional
right or freedom if the ethnic minority MPs themselves provide
their assent for such an amendment. Hence, constitutional rigidity in Kosovo assures that ethnic minority rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution remain intact. This assures against any action by the majority MPs in Parliament
and thus reduces concerns of the majority reducing ethnic minority rights and privileges. In addition, this model of constitutional rigidity makes the ethnic minority MPs themselves responsible for and capable of controlling and having the capacity
to protect their electorate’s constitutional rights and freedoms.
Moreover, the Constitutional Court is also responsible for making sure that the chapter dedicated to human rights and privileges remains unchanged by any constitutional amendment. 58
See La Porta, supra note 46, at 447.
For more information on the ethnic minorities’ rights and freedoms in
Kosovo see generally Emma Lantschner, Protection of Minority Communities
in Kosovo: Legally Ahead for European Standards—Practically Still a Long
Way to Go, 33 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 451 (2008).
58 For a counter-majoritarian ruling of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo, which certainly follows a constitutional rigidity rationale, see generally
GYJKATA KUSHTETUESE [CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOSOVO] Qemajl Kurtisi v.
Municipal Assembly of Prizren, Mar. 18, 2010, CASE NO. KO 01/09, available
at http://www.gjk-ks.org/repository/docs/ko_01_09_Ven_ang.pdf; For a discussion of how public opinion disapproves of this, see generally Kundershtohet Vendimi i Gjykates Kushtetuese per Emblemen e Prizrenit, Kosova Info
56
57
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Overall, one could argue that the Kosovo Constitution’s bill of
rights and the Constitutional Court’s case law have a countermajoritarian nature, which could boost popular opposition to it.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGIDITY, “EUROPEANIZATION,” AND
UPDATING THE KOSOVO CONSTITUTION
Rigid constitutions face problems with respect to the dynamism of societal and political affairs. The problems concerned relate to the fact that rigid constitutions are hard to
amend, changes in societal and political affairs would require
updated constitutional regulations. Thus, constitutional rigidity makes it difficult for these constitutions to adapt to dynamic
societal affairs, which would be best addressed from a constitutional perspective. In view of this problem, one should question
whether there is any way of updating the Constitution of Kosovo. Certainly, in constitutional regimes having a rigid nature
this role rests with the Constitutional Court, 59 which must interpret and update constitutional rules. 60
Therefore, in this section, we question whether the role of
the Kosovan Constitutional Court in interpreting and upholding the “updated” character of the Constitution has any meaning in terms of the overall constitutional openness.
To start with, it is worth noting “… abstraction is neces(Prishtine), available at http://www.kosova.info/2010/03/kundershtohetvendimi-i-gjykates-kushtetuese-per-emblemen-e-prizrenit/.
59 For example, the US Supreme Court decision of Marbury v. Madison,
which establishes the doctrine of judicial review, shows that even without an
amendment, the Court can create a “factual” amendment, see Walter Murphy, McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Emeritus at Princeton University, Lecture at 2000 Harry Eckstein Lecture at Univ. of California at Irvine,
Constitutional Interpretation as Constitutional Creation, available at
http://www.democ.uci.edu/research/lecture%20series/murphy.php
60 For a review of how the US Supreme Court has substantially altered
the founding principles of the American Constitution by adapting them to societal changes, see generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES
REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION (2006). There is evidence that a third way of
amending a constitution occurs in practice, namely the change of constitutional principles through customs and political evolution, such as the practice
of transferring the government from a monarchy to an elected government in
Europe, see generally Roger D. Congleton, On the Durability of King and
Council: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy, 12 CONST.
POL. ECON. 193 (2001), available at http://rdc1.net/forthcoming/kingcon.pdf.
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sary for a rigid Constitution to preserve its democratic legitimacy through time.” 61 In view of this argument, one would
question whether the nature of the Kosovo Constitution allows
for vital rulings by the Constitutional Court. It is quite hard to
say whether the Kosovo Constitution is abstract enough to allow change over time. However, in order to question the issue
of dynamism with respect to the Constitutional Court’s role in
updating the Constitution, we approach the issue by analyzing
Article 53 of the Constitution.
Article 53 of the Kosovo Constitution states “[h]uman
rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by this Constitution shall be interpreted consistent with the court decisions of
the European Court of Human Rights.” 62 In light of Article 53,
one can argue that the Constitutional Court’s rulings, with regard to the interpretation of the substantive rights and freedoms granted by the Constitution, must be kept in line with
the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) case law.
Therefore, the ECtHR’s case law is a mandatory reference for
all interpretations by the Kosovan Constitutional Court as far
as human rights are concerned. 63
Based on Article 53 and the rigid character of the Kosovo
Constitution, there are a number of consequences resulting
from the Kosovan Constitutional Court’s role. First, the Constitutional Court is obliged to interpret the Constitution, not
only on the basis of constitutional norms, but also on ECtHR
case law. Hence, the Kosovo Constitution is not a closed constitution, rather it is fully open, and the Constitutional Court’s
rulings must comply with the substance of ECtHR case law. 64
Ferreres-Comella, supra note 38, at 50.
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO June 15, 2008, art. 53,
available at http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf.
63 For more information on how the European Court of Human Rights’
rulings are implemented at the national level, see generally Eur. Comm. for
Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Implementation of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 53d Sess.,
Doc. No. CDL-AD (2002) 34 (2002), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2002/CDL-AD(2002)034-e.asp.
64 See GYJKATA KUSHTETUESE [CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOSOVO] Imer
Ibrahimi and 48 other former employees of the Kosovo Energy Corporation v.
49 Judgments of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kosovo, June 23, 2010,
61
62
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Second, given the rigid character of the Constitution, the
Constitutional Court is given the task of adapting the Constitution to recent circumstances and societal affairs. In view of
this problem, therefore, the Constitutional Court will uphold
the “updated” character of the Constitution because it is based
on the dynamism of ECtHR case law, 65 as required by Article
53 of the Kosovo Constitution. With this in mind, the Constitutional Court, given the rigid nature of the Constitution and its
crucial role in upholding the up-to-the-minute character of the
hard-to-change Constitution, will interpret it on basis of
ECtHR case law, which is rather up-to-date.
Third, since the Constitutional Court’s rulings will stand
in harmony with ECtHR case law, then, the rulings concerned
will “europeanize” the Kosovo Constitution. 66 The ‘Strasbourgization’ of the Constitutional Court’s rulings, which stand as final and have constitutionally legal power, will produce a constitutional regime that is updated on the basis of ECtHR case
law, whereas the legislature would find itself incapable of overturning the Constitutional Court’s rulings with an amendment,
thus making it impossible for the legislature to challenge the
Constitutional Court’s rulings. In effect, this results in the Kosovo Constitution being ‘factually’ amended in accordance with
the ECtHR’s perspective.
CONCLUSION
This article has discussed constitutional rigidity from the
perspective of Kosovan constitutional law. In general, the article has argued that the Kosovo Constitution is a rigid one and
that the amendment process is such that amendments are allowed only if an ethnically-consented double supermajority is
achieved.
CASE NO. KI 40/09, available at http://www.gjk-ks.org/repository/docs/ki_40_09_ang_vendimi_meritor.pdf.
65 For more information on ECtHR case law and its recent trend of dynamism, see generally FRANCIS G. JACOBS ET AL., THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS (5th ed., 2010).
66 Some argue that ECtHR case law is a constitutional model for Europe,
see STEVEN C. GREER, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 171 (2006).
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Initially, the article questioned the issue of constitutional
rigidity from the perspective of scholarship. Then, the article
embarked on the particulars of the Kosovo Constitution. The
article described the manner in which a constitutional amendment can be initiated, arguing that this right is monopolized by
institutional actors. In this context, the Kosovo Constitution’s
amendment process is open to political initiatives, but closed to
the people.
The article then depicted the constitutional amendment
adoption process. The article argued that the adoption of a constitutional amendment is closed to popular initiatives, and that
direct popular participation in no way exists. Additionally, the
amendment process requires a double supermajority in Parliament, namely, a supermajority of the entire Parliament and
a supermajority of the MPs representing ethnic communities.
Overall, the amendment process set by the Constitution is in
some way counter-majoritarian, however, ethnically plural.
The article shows that the Kosovo Constitution is a rather rigid
one.
Subsequently, the article discussed the issue of constitutional rigidity in face of the model of separation of powers set
by the Constitution, arguing that with the pure parliamentary
model of governance that Kosovo has, constitutional rigidity
will precondition the Constitutional Court to have power over
the executive and legislative branches, whereas the rigidity as
such would practically immobilize Parliament from putting a
constitutional amendment in place easily.
Next, the article discussed the issue of constitutional rigidity in terms of human rights in Kosovo, arguing that constitutional rigidity will give the Constitutional Court authority to
determine through its own case-law the substance of constitutional human rights, while allowing no legislative counterbalance in this regard.
Finally, the article questioned the issue of dynamism of the
Kosovo Constitution in the context of the rigidity, arguing that
the authority to update the Constitution rests with the Constitutional Court, whereas on basis of Article 53, the Court is preconditioned to ‘Strasbourgize’ its case law.
In conclusion, the Kosovo Constitution is rather rigid, and
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this authoritatively strengthens the role and authority of the
Constitutional Court. On basis of this, the Court will, through
its own case law, adapt the Constitution so that it conforms
with current societal needs and the balancing aims vis-à-vis
the executive and legislative branches. In addition, despite the
fact that constitutional rigidity in Kosovo has a countermajoritarian nature, it might produce many counterbalancing
results in terms of political or partisan interests.

